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PARKS v. "MR. FORD" AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF A
RATIONAL APPROACH TO RESOLVING INCONSISTENCIES
IN RESULTS OF DUE PROCESS ATTACKS ON
CREDITORS' REMEDIES
DAVID
I.

A.

SCHOLLt

INTRODUCTION

THE RECENT Third Circuit en banc decision in the case of Parks
v. "Mr. Ford"' elicited a spectrum of opinions2 on the issue of
state action in creditors' remedies. The specific remedies challenged
in Parks were the detention and sale aspects of the repairman's lien
in Pennsylvania. The court's discussion, however, included references to creditors' remedies cases in other contexts. Part II of this
article describes the Parks opinions in detail.3 Part III enumerates
the inconsistencies among the decisions in the creditors' remedies
cases throughout the country, discusses the landmark decisions in
this area of the law, highlights the crucial factors in these decisions,
and recommends factors that the author feels should be emphasized
by a court confronted with the issue of the presence of state action in
creditors' remedies. 4 The article concludes with speculation on the
effect of the Parks decision which, according to the author, may be
5
considerable.

t A.B., Franklin and Marshall College, 1966; J.D., Villanova School of Law,
1969. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
Mr. Scholl argued both Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972) and Parham v.
Cortese, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (companion case to Fuentes v. Shevin) before the Supreme
Court for the consumer-plaintiffs and was also counsel for the consumer-plaintiffs in

Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974) and Parks
v. "Mr. Ford," 556 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1977).
1. 556 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1977).
2. Five separate opinions were filed in this decision. See note 13 infra.The Parks

plurality included Judge Van Dusen who has since retired and been replaced by
former district judge Judge Higginbotham. Judge Higginbotham's views on state

action in the context of creditors' remedies is uncertain. He avoided the issue when
possibly confronted with it in Younger v. Plunkett, 395 F. Supp. 702 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
The only clue is his relatively expansive expression of due process in Isaacs v. Board
of Trustees of Temple Univ., 385 F. Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1974), the reasoning of which

was adopted by the majority of the Third Circuit in Braden v. University of
Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 948, 962-63 (3d Cir. 1977) (en banc).
3. See notes 6-61 and accompanying text infra.
4. See notes 62-239 and accompanying text infra.
5. See note 240 and accompanying text infra.

(713)
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Five Pennsylvania residents brought suit under section 1983 of
the Civil Rights Act of 18716 against automobile repairmen who had
retained possession of the owners' automobiles subsequent to the
plaintiffs' refusal to pay the amounts which the repairmen charged
for repairs. 7 Pennsylvania common law confers upon a repairman
the right to retain possession of items that he repairs until he is paid
for his work.8 Pennsylvania statutes grant to a repairman the right

6. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Id.
7. Parks v. "Mr. Ford", 386 F. Supp. 1251 (E.D. Pa. 1975). Plaintiff Gilbert Parks
claimed that he took his car to Ford's Speed Shop on or about February 4, 1972, and
authorized the replacement of a transmission seal, a job he estimated would cost $30.
Id. at 1253. After being notified that the bill was $203, Parks refused to pay and Ford
retained possession. Id. Eventually, Ford recovered a judgment against Parks for
$125. Id. Parks paid the judgment, regained possession of the automobile and sought
damages for the alleged improper detention. Id.
Plaintiff Hattie Ellerbe had her 1960 Chevrolet automobile towed to Bradley's
Automobile Service on or about January 30, 1972. Id. She claimed that she asked for
an estimate and was subsequently notified that the repairs had been completed and
the charges totaled $493.02. Id. After Ellerbe refused to pay, Bradley's counsel
informed her that Bradley was retaining the vehicle, asserting a repairman's lien. Id.
Bradley placed the car on the street, where Ellerbe later found it stripped of its wheels
and other parts. Id. Ellerbe maintained that she was entitled to damages. Id.
Plaintiff Lewis Williams brought his car to Erwin Chevrolet, Inc. in April,
1972. Id. Williams claimed that Erwin agreed to install a starter motor that Williams
had purchased elsewhere for a labor charge of $12. Id. Erwin allegedly installed a
rebuilt motor and billed Williams $48.55. Id. After Williams' refusal to pay, Erwin
retained possession and notified Williams that the automobile would be placed in
storage. Id. at 1253-54. Although Williams regained possession of his vehicle through
agreement of counsel, he sought damages for the allegedly improper detention. Id. at
1254.
Plaintiff Lois Dillon brought her automobile to North Penn Motors on or
about June 25, 1971. Id. Plaintiffs vehicle was repaired after a delay due to a labor
dispute. Id. However, she was also billed an additional $198 for replacement of wheels
and tires which had been stolen from the car while in North Penn Motors' lot, and she
refused to pay for the wheels and tires. Id. Dillion furnished bond and took possession
of the car pursuant to an order of Judge Masterson. Id. Both Dillon's right to
possession and her claim for damages were in dispute. Id.
In September, 1972, plaintiff William Muldowney, Jr. authorized International Cycles, Inc. to repair a gasket and an oil pump on his motorcycle, provided the
cost did not exceed $50. Id. In April, 1973, Muldowney was notified that the
motorcycle had been rebuilt and the bill was $400. Id. Muldowney refused to pay and
International retained possession. Id. Subsequently, International lost its lease and
Muldowney's motorcycle was broken down into pieces of metal by the new owner. Id.
Plaintiff claimed damages and abandoned his vehicle as worthless. Id.
8. Wilson v. Malenock, 128 Pa. Super. Ct. 544, 194 A. 508 (1937).
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to sell the items retained under his common law lien. 9 Plaintiffs
asserted that the retention and sale elements of these repairman's
liens violated their due process rights under the fourteenth
amendment 10 by permitting repairmen to deprive plaintiffs of use or
ownership of their property without prior judicial determination of

the validity of the underlying claim." The United States District

9. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 11-14 (Purdon 1963) provide:
§ 11. Procedure for sale of personal property under common law lien
Hereafter where any person, corporation, firm, or copartnership may have
what is known as a "common law lien" for work done or material furnished
about the repair of any personal property belonging to another person,
corporation, firm, or copartnership, it shall be lawful for such person,
corporation, firm, or copartnership having said common law lien, while such
property is in the hands of the said person, corporation, firm or copartnership
contributing such work and material, to give notice in writing to the owner of the
amount of indebtedness for which said common law lien is claimed for the labor
and material that has entered into the repair, alteration, improvement, or
otherwise, done upon the said property. If the said claim for work or material is
not paid within thirty days the said person, corporation, firm or copartnership to
which said money is due, may proceed to sell the said property, as hereinafter
provided: Provided, however, that the owner of said property, if he disputes said
bill, may issue a writ of replevin, as provided by law, within the said thirty days,
and the said dispute shall be settled in said action of replevin.
§ 12. Notice of sale
The notice hereinbefore provided for shall contain an itemized statement
setting forth the work and material furnished for the repair, alteration, or
improvement of the said personal property, and shall be verified by oath of the
claimant; and if said claim is not paid within said thirty days then the said
claimant may sell the said property at public sale by giving ten days' notice
thereof in the same manner as personal property is sold by sheriff or constable.
§ 13. Disposition of proceeds
After satisfying the lien and any costs that may accrue, any residue
remaining shall on demand, within six months, be paid to the owner of the
property; and if such residue is not demanded within six months from the date of
the sale, the same shall be deposited by the person making the sale with the
treasurer of the county, together with a statement of the claim and the costs of
enforcing the same, as copy of the published notice, and of the amounts received
for the goods at said sale. Said residue shall by the county treasurer be credited
to the general revenue fund of the county, subject to the right of the owner, or his
personal representatives, to reclaim the same at any time within three years
from the date of the deposit with the county treasurer.
§ 14. Title on sale
All sales of property made under this act shall be as conclusive to the title
conveyed as if sold by a sheriff or constable.
Id.
It should be noted that the Pennsylvania statutes do not codify the
repairman's detention lien. This lien is assumed to exist in the common law of
Pennsylvania, as § 11 makes clear. Section 11 merely adds the right to sell to the
common law right to detain and the following sections establish the sale procedure.
See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 11-14 (Purdon 1963).
10. The fifth amendment guarantees that "[n]o person shall .. . be deprived of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The
fourteenth amendment makes this guarantee applicable to the states. See U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
11. Parks v. "Mr. Ford", 386 F. Supp. 1251, 1252-53 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary
judgment against each plaintiff, concluding that neither the
retention nor the sale of a motor vehicle by a repairman was action
"under color of' Pennsylvania law.12 On appeal, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, sitting en banc, 13 affirmed in
part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that: 1) the
retention of a customer's vehicle by a repairman pursuant to the
common law repairman's lien did not constitute state action under
color of state law as required by section 1983; 2) state action is
present when a repairman sells a customer's vehicle pursuant to
Pennsylvania's statutes; and 3) the Pennsylvania statutes authorizing sale of a vehicle by a repairman do not satisfy the due process
requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
Judge Garth began the plurality opinion by observing that, in
Magill v. Avonworth Baseball Conference,14 the Third Circuit had
identified three categories of cases in which private parties were held
to be involved in state action: 1) where state courts enforce a private
agreement; 2) where the state is significantly involved with a private
party; and 3) where there was private performance of a public
function.' 5 He dismissed the first category because "the defendants
1' 6
never invoked the assistance of state courts to enforce their liens.'
Turning to the second category, Judge Garth initially distinguished
Fuentes v. Shevin 1 7 and Sniadach v. FamilyFinance Corp.'8 because
no state official is involved, however ministerially or insignificantly,
in repairman's actions. 19 The court determined that Hunter v.
Erickson2° and Reitman v.Mulkey 2' were "readily distinguishable"
since the private activity in the repairman's lien situation "does not
involve racial discrimination. ' 22 The third category of state action
cases was distinguished principally on the basis of Gibbs V.
Titelman,23 because the actions of the repairmen were not tradition12. Id. at 1269-1270. A motion for reconsideration was also denied by the district
court. Parks v. "Mr. Ford", 68 F.R.D. 305 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
13. Judge Garth wrote an opinion for a plurality of the court. Judges Adams,
Gibbons and Hunter concurred and wrote separate opinions. Chief Judge Seitz
concurred in part and dissented in part and filed an opinion in which Judge Aldisert
joined.
14. 516 F.2d 1328, 1330-31 (3d Cir. 1975).
15. 556 F.2d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 1977) (plurality opinion), citing id.
16. 556 F.2d 135 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted).
17. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See notes 98-102 and accompanying text infra.
18. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). See notes 75-81 and accompanying text infra.
19. 556 F.2d at 136-37 (plurality opinion).
20. 393 U.S. 385 (1969). See notes 211-13 and accompanying text infra.
21. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See notes 208-10 and accompanying text infra.
22. 556 F.2d at 137 (plurality opinion).
23. 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974). In Gibbs, the Third
Circuit held that self-help repossession of automobiles under the Uniform Commercial
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ally reserved to the state since the retention lien existed at common
law.

24

In contrast, Judge Garth found state action in the repairman's
power to sell. 25 He was impressed with the language in two of the
repairman's lien statutes that expressly stated that the repairman
may proceed in the same manner as a sheriff or constable in
conducting the lien-enforcement sale. 26 Judge Garth found significance in the fact that "the garageman's power to sell property
retained under his common law lien, unlike the lien itself, was not
authorized prior to the enactment of the statute in 1925 and arises
'27
solely from that legislation.
Having found state action present in the sales provisions, Judge
Garth next concluded that the entirely extrajudicial sale process was
violative of due process 28 on the basis of the standards set forth in
North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v.Di-Chem, Inc.,29 Fuentes,30 and
31
Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank of New York.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Hunter, the author of the Gibbs
opinion, underscored his understanding that the fact that the
retention lien was established by Pennsylvania common law rather
than by statute was irrelevant.3 2 A different conclusion, noted Judge
Hunter, would result in the same conduct entailing different due
process consequences in different jurisdictions simply because of the
existence of a state statute.33 He also rejected reliance upon the
the same powers in
statutory language granting the repairman
34
execution as a sheriff or constable.
Rather, Judge Hunter narrowed the distinction between the
detention and sale features of the Pennsylvania repairman's lien law

Code did not involve state action. Id. at 1113. See note 138 and accompanying text
infra.
24. 556 F.2d at 138-39 (plurality opinion).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 141 (plurality opinion). See text of PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 12, 14
(Purdon 1963) supra note 9.
27. 556 F.2d at 141 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted). Assuming arguendo that

Judge Garth was correct in concluding that the common law history of the lien is
significant, he is surely correct about the common law history of the sale provision.
The common law never provided the repairman with a right to sell the property
subject to his lien. See Younger v. Plunkett, 395 F. Supp. 702, 707 n.6 (E.D. Pa. 1975);
R. BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 119, at 588-89 (2d ed. 1955); G.
PATrON, BAILMENT IN THE COMMON LAW, 186-87 (1952).
28. 556 F.2d at 142-43 (plurality opinion).
29. 419 U.S. 601 (1975). See notes 105-07 and accompanying text infra.
30. 407 U.S. 67 (1972). See notes 98-102 and accompanying text infra.

31. 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976). See note 233 infra.
32. 556 F.2d at 163 (Hunter, J., concurring).

33. Id.
34. Id. at 164 (Hunter, J., concurring).
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to one factor: the common law history of detention. 35 Consistent with
his opinion in Gibbs, Judge Hunter maintained that common law
heritage was the touchstone, and perhaps the only legitimate
consideration, in resolving the application of "the public function
36
inquiry" in state action cases.
Judge Gibbons' concurring opinion was far removed from the
reasoning of Judges Garth and Hunter. He began by attributing the
success of creditors' state action arguments in cases challenging
consumer remedies to judicial disquiet that resulted "from a judicial
philosophy favorably disposed toward the protection of creditors"
and "from a political philosophy of distrust of national lawmaking
through the fourteenth amendment and of confidence only in the
fairness and wisdom of local solutions. ' 37 Judge Gibbons believed
that the creditors'-remedies cases had "obvious distinctions" from
the other cases in which the Supreme Court found no state action to
38
be present.
Judge Gibbons then developed his theory of state action,
maintaining that state action was not a "unitary concept" that could
be confined to a few categories of cases. 39 He observed that the state
may act in many roles, specifically listing those of principal,
delegator of functions, coercer, sanctioner and facilitator of transactions, and lawgiver. 40 In his discussion of the state as coercer, Judge
Gibbons rejected the plurality's finding that state action considerations should vary between cases involving racial discrimination and
all others.4 ' In his discussion of the state as sanctioner and
facilitator of transactions, he rejected the plurality's reliance on the
presence of a court action by the repairman as necessary to establish
state action, since the state may sanction and facilitate apart from
court action. 42 In his discussion of the state as lawgiver, Judge
Gibbons "emphatically disagree[d]" with the position that the
common law heritage of a particular state procedure was significant
in resolving the state action issue. 43 He pointed out that the
enactment of the fourteenth amendment in 1867 established a "new
form of scrutiny" of state laws, concluding that "the creation of law

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

163 (Hunter, J., concurring).
149 (Gibbons, J.,
150 (Gibbons, J.,
150-51 (Gibbons,
151 (Gibbons, J.,
152 (Gibbons, J.,
154-55 (Gibbons,
155 (Gibbons, J.,
155-56 (Gibbons,

concurring) (footnotes omitted).
concurring).
J., concurring).
concurring).
concurring). See id. at 137 (plurality opinion).
J., concurring).
concurring).
J., concurring).
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is state action" and that only conduct defined by the state as
remaining within the scope of private ordering does not involve state
action.

44

Thus, Judge Gibbons determined that state action was present
in both the repairman's detention lien and sale procedure. 45 The
state's involvement in certification in the post-sale transfer, a factor
upon which the plurality expressly refused to rely, 46 was, according
47
to Judge Gibbons, sufficient in itself to establish state action.
Nevertheless, he concurred in the result reached by Judge Garth.48
Describing the issue as "extremely close," Judge Gibbons found that
the initial consensual possession of the property by the repairman
rendered the subsequent detention pursuant to the lien not violative
49
of due process.
Chief Judge Seitz and Judge Aldisert joined in most of Judge
Gibbons' opinion. However, they would have gone one step further
and held the repairman's detention lien violative of due process of
law, as well as infused with state action.50 They reasoned that none
of the saving characteristics present in the Mitchell v. W.T. Grant
Co. 51 procedure were present in the instant case.5 2 They differed with
Judge Gibbons in their characterization of the repairman as a bailee
of the property repaired, who must, under ordinary circumstances,
53
return the chattel upon the owner's request.
In his separate concurrence, Judge Adams presented an
approach quite distinct from the other judges. He found state action
in both the detention and sale features of the lien because the private

45. Id. at 157-59 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
46. Judge Garth stated, "In holding that action is inherent in sales conducted
under the Pennsylvania statutory scheme, we do not rely at all upon the fact that
state employees in the Bureau of Motor Vehicles ...issue a certificate of title for the
vehicle in the garageman's name." Id. at 141 (plurality opinion).
47. Id. at 158 (Gibbons, J., concurring). Gibbs was distinguished because
possession in Gibbs was secured pursuant to a contract right rather than pursuant
solely to a statute as in Parks. Id. at 158-59 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 162 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
49. Id. at 161 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
50. Id. at 164-65 (Seitz, C.J., concurring and dissenting in part).
51. 416 U.S. 600 (1974). According to Chief Judge Seitz, the Louisiana attachment
statute present in Mitchell contained the following procedural safeguards:
(1) the remedy was limited to goods in which a security interest had been
retained, thus simplifying the issue of the creditor's right to possess; (2) a judge
rather than a clerk issued the writ; (3) the creditor was required to file an
affidavit alleging specific facts based upon personal knowledge entitling it to
possession; and (4) the creditor was required to prove its claim at an immediate
postseizure hearing if the writ was not to be dissolved.
556 F.2d at 165 (Seitz, C. J., concurring and dissenting in part). See text
accompanying notes 104-07 infra.
52. 556 F.2d at 165-66 (Seitz, C. J., concurring and dissenting in part).
53. Id. at 166 (Seitz, C. J., concurring and dissenting in part).
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parties were engaged in a public function - the resolution of
conflicts. 54 He opined that Judges Garth and Hunter had erred in
concentrating too fully on the particular conduct rather than "the
broader generic category of resolution of conflicts." 55 He accepted
Judge Gibbons' point that the enactment of the fourteenth amendment rendered irrelevant the common law origin of the procedure at
issue, although he expressly rejected Judge Gibbons' reasoning that
the public function analysis is not applicable because the repairman
acts solely for his own benefit.56 Instead, adhering to a public
function analysis, Judge Adams found both the detention and sale
aspects of the repairman's lien indistinguishable for state action
purposes from the creditor's remedies attacked in Fuentes57 and
Sniadach58 because the governmentally approved machinery of
59
conflict resolution was present.
However, Judge Adams concurred in the result because he was
not convinced that there was proof on the Parks record that the
detention lien violated due process. 60 He maintained that empirical
data, absent from the Parks record, weighing the interests of the
repairman and customer was necessary before a decision could be
6
made. '

III.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF A RATIONAL APPROACH IN
RESOLVING INCONSISTENCIES IN RESULTS OF DUE
PROCESS ATTACKS ON CREDITORS' REMEDIES

A.

The Inconsistencies

Subsequent to the Parks decision, it is possible to make the
following observations about creditors' remedies in Pennsylvania on
the basis of direct precedent from recent federal decisions:
1. It is unconstitutional for a creditor to take back consumer
goods in which he has a security interest, after filing a bond and a
court action, with the help of a sheriff,62 but it is not unconstitutional
for a creditor to take back the goods himself, without filing a bond

54. Id. at 146 (Adams, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 144 n.5 (Adams, J., concurring). See id. at 152 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
56. Id. at 145 (Adams, J., concurring).
57. See notes 98-102 and accompanying text infra.
58. See notes 75-81 and accompanying text infra.
59. 556 F.2d at 146 n.12 (Adams, J., concurring).
60. Id. at 143 (Adams, J., concurring).
61. Id. at 143 n.1 (Adams, J., concurring).
62. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (companion case to Parham v.
Cortese).

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss4/5

8

Scholl: Parks v. Mr. Ford and the Development of a Rational Approach to R

1977-1978]

PARKS V. "MR. FORD"

and without court supervision which might temper an unconsciona63
ble seizure.
2. It is unconstitutiondl for a repairman to sell goods which he
holds pursuant to his lien (the Parks holding), but it is not
unconstitutional for either a warehouseman 64 or an innkeeper 65 to
sell goods which he retains pursuant to his almost identical
common law lien.
3. A repairman is not involved in state action when he retains
a customer's property; however, he is involved in state action if he
attempts to sell that property, even if the sale invokes no
participation of state officials.66
An examination of other circuit court decisions only reinforces
the inconsistencies. The Ninth Circuit has held that an innkeeper's
detention and sale of a customer's property pursuant to a statutory
lien involves state action, 67 while a warehouseman's sale of a
customer's property pursuant to a statutory lien does not.6 8 In the
Second Circuit, it appears that a warehouseman 9 and a repairman 7
are involved in state action when enforcing their liens, while in the
71
Seventh Circuit neither are held to engage in state action.
These inconsistencies which appear merely from an examination of the decisions of the circuit courts of appeals represent the tip
of an iceberg of inconsistency in the lower courts. 72 Although a
majority of the lower courts have stricken summary liens, a sizeable

63. See Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d 1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 US. 1039
(1974).

64. See Smith v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 384 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
65. See Washington v. Saxe, orderfiled, C. A. No. 74-593 (M.D. Pa., Dec. 27, 1974).
66. See Parks v. "Mr. Ford", 566 F.2d 132 (3d Cir. 1977).
67. See Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975).
68. See Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1976).
69. See Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 54
(1977).
70. See Hernandez v. European Auto Collision, Inc., 487 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1973).
71. See Anastasia v. Cosmopolitan National Bank of Chicago, 527 F.2d 150 (7th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 971 (1976) (warehouseman); Phillips v. Money, 503
F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975) (repairman).
72. The inconsistencies which have developed in the findings of state action in
the lien and repossession cases have prompted a series of legal commentary, most of it
critical of the decisions in the repossession cases. See, e.g., Catz & Robinson, Due
Process and Creditor's Remedies: From Sniadach and Fuentes to Mitchell, North
Georgia and Beyond, 28 RUTGERS L. REV. 541, 572-86 (1975); Clark & Landers,
Sniadach, Fuentes, and Beyond: The CreditorMeets the Constitution,59 VA. L. REV.
355, 377-83 (1973). Three articles are especially worthwhile because they posit new
ideas and approaches to the resolution of the issues in the lien and repossession cases.
See Nerken, A New Deal for the Protection of Fourteenth Amendment Rights:
Challengingthe Doctrinal Bases of the Civil Right Cases and State Action Theory, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 297 (1977); Yudaf, The Legal Status of Private
Repossession, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 954 (1974); Comment, State Action: A Pathology and
a Proposed Cure, 64 CALIF. L. REV. 146 (1976).
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minority have not. 73 However, courts which have held various liens
unconstitutional have consistently refused to find the requisite state
74
action present when considering creditors' repossession.
B.

The Due Process Attacks on Creditors' Remedies

The seminal case involving due process attacks on creditors'
remedies is Sniadach v. Family Finance Co. 75 In Sniadach, the
Supreme Court struck down a Wisconsin statute which permitted a
creditor to obtain a prejudgment wage garnishment from his
debtor's employer26 Justice Douglas, in his majority opinion, spoke

73. Innkeeper's lien detentions and sales have been held unconstitutional by
some courts. See, e.g., Johnson v. Riverside Hotel, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 1138 (S.D. Fla.
1975); Brinkley v. Merrill, judgment filed, No. C-258-73 (D.Utah, Oct. 3, 1973); Klim v.
Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Blye v. Globe-Wernicke Realty Co., 33 N.Y.2d
15, 300 N.E.2d 710, 347 N.Y.S.2d 170 (1973). Contra,Washington v. Saxe, order filed,
C.A. No. 74-593 (M.D. Pa., Dec. 27, 1974).
Other courts have held unconstitutional repairman's lien seizures and sales.
See, e.g., Lee v. Cooper, C.A. No. 74-104 (D.N.J., March 21, 1974); Straley v. Gassaway
Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D.W. Va. 1973); Ford v. Dean's O.K. Tire Store, Inc.,
judgment filed, CIVIL-LV 1974 (D. Nev. 1973).
Several courts have held sales unconstitutional while not discussing seizures.
See, e.g., Swiggett v. Watson, 441 F. Supp. 241 (D. Del. 1977); Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F.
Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975); Howard v. Four.Star Maintenance, Inc., judgment filed,
No. 74-A-427 (D. Colo., Dec. 19, 1974); Whitmore v. New Jersey Div. of Motor
Vehicles, 137 N.J. Super. 492, 349 A.2d 560 (1975); Sharrock v. Dell Buick-Cadillac,
Inc., 56 App. Div. 2d 446, 393 N.Y.S.2d 166 (1977). Still other courts have held lien
sales unconstitutional while expressly not holding detention liens unconstitutional.
See, e.g., Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F. Supp. 491 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (three-judge court);
Adams v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr.
145 (1973). Contra, Daniels v. Frassica, order filed, C.A. No. 73-2946-F (D. Mass.,
Nov. 15, 1974). Unlike the Parks majority, both the Caldwell and Adams courts found
state action to be present, but held, like Judges Gibbons and Adams in Parks, that due
process was not violated.
Landlord's liens have been stricken in many cases. See, e.g., Adams v. Joseph
F. Sanson Inv. Co., 376 F. Supp. 61 (D. Nev. 1974); Stroemer v. Shevin, 399 F. Supp.
993 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Barber v. Rader, 350 F. Supp. 183 (S.D. Fla. 1972) (three-judge
court); MacQueen v. Lambert, 348 F. Supp. 1334 (M.D. Fla. 1972); Dielen v. Levine, 344
F. Supp. 823 (D. Neb. 1972); Holt v. Brown, 336 F. Supp. 2 (W.D. Ky. 1971).
Also closely related are the decisions that have held the Pennsylvania
landlord's distraint provisions unconstitutional. See, e.g., Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F.
Supp. 152 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (three-judge court); Stots v. Media Real Estate Co., 355 F.
Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Musselman v. Spies, 343 F. Supp. 528 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (threejudge court); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 384 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (three-judge court).
74. See, e.g., Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974);
Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1974); Gibbs v. Titelman, 502 F.2d
1107 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1039 (1974); Brantley v. Union Bank & Trust Co.,
498 F.2d 365 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1034 (1974); Nowlin v. Professional
Auto Sales, 496 F.2d 16 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974); Shirley v. State
Nat'l Bank of Conn., 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974); Adams
v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1006 (1974); Benschoter v. First Nat'l Bank, 218 Kan. 114, 542 P.2d 1042 (1975), appeal
dismissed for want of substantialfederal question, 425 U.S. 928 (1976).
75. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
76. Id. at 342.
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723

largely of the hardships and inequities worked by the particular
Wisconsin procedure, stating:
The result is that a prejudgment garnishment of the
Wisconsin type may as a practical matter drive a wage-earning
family to the wall. Where the taking of one's property is so
obvious, it needs no extended argument to conclude that absent
notice and a prior hearing this prejudgment garnishment
77
procedure violates the fundamental principles of due process.
A more solid foundation for attacks on other creditors' remedies
appeared in Justice Harlan's concurrence, which focused on the
deprivation of a wage-earner's wages without notice or prior
hearing. 78 Such due process requirements prior to a property
deprivation were, according to Justice Harlan, derived "from
concepts which are part of the Anglo-American legal heritage
"79

The contours of Justice Douglas' opinion were initially difficult
to determine. The opinion may be read as applicable only to wages,
to deprivations of income, to only those deprivations which can be
found to drive persons "to the wall," or to any property deprivations
which precede the entry of a judgment. Nowhere is there any
discussion of state action; despite the very slight ministerial
involvement of any state officer,80 state action was presumed to be
present by the Court. 8 '
In Pennsylvania, the first post Sniadach attacks on creditors'
remedies were launched against confessions of judgment and
extrajudicial rent distraint, since these procedures were the most
oppressive remedies present in the state at that time. In Swarb v.
Lennox,8 2 a class action was brought challenging the Pennsylvania
confession of judgment procedure which permitted a creditor to
extract from a debtor, by means of a contract clause uniformly
buried in all consumer creditor documents and leases then utilized in
Pennsylvania, authority for the creditors' attorney or the prothonotary to enter an ex parte judgment against the debtor prior to any
•

77. Id. at 341-42 (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
78. Id. at 342-44 (Harlan, J., concurring).
79. Id. at 342-43 (Harlan, J., concurring).
80. The creditor's lawyer requested a writ of garnishment from the clerk of the
court, who then issued the writ which the creditor's lawyer served upon the garnishee.
Id. at 338.
81. Even Justice Black's dissent did not mention the possibility that state action
was not present. See id. at 344-51 (Black, J., dissenting).
82. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (three-judge court), affl'd, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
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default and which could serve as the basis for an execution sale of
the debtor's property upon the creditor's or landlord's ex parte
averment of default.8 3 The court framed the issue as whether the
debtors had knowingly waived their due process rights guaranteed
in Sniadach.84 The Swarb court concluded that the plaintiffs had
proven that confessions were not validly waived only as to the class
of persons whose income was less than $10,000, or married persons
whose combined income was less than $10,000 annually.8 5
The seminal distraint case in Pennsylvania is Santiago v.
McElroy.86 The plaintiffs in Santiago challenged a statutory scheme
that permitted a landlord to make a prejudgment extrajudicial
seizure of a tenant's belongings for alleged nonpayment of rent.8 7 A
right to so distrain was routinely included in all Pennsylvania leases
then in use. Addressing the significance of the lease agreement,
Judge Lord stated:
We take judicial notice of the fact that form leases are put before
tenants on an "accept this or get nothing" basis, . . . and that
tenants - who need housing - are compelled to sign. There is

no freedom of contract - there is merely a freedom88to adhere to
the terms of the contract written by the landlord.

83. 314 F. Supp. at 1093-94.
84. See id. at 1095, 1100.
85. Id. at 1102-03. The court based its decision on a study by Dr. David Caplovitz,
prepared for a work later published as D. CAPLOVITZ, CONSUMERS IN TROUBLE (1974).

314 F. Supp. at 1097. The study found that consumers almost never realized the effect
of confession clauses or even that confession clauses appeared in their contracts. Id.
However, since 96% of the persons in the study earned less than $10,000 annually, the
court limited relief to individuals earning less than $10,000. Id. at 1098-99.
A question remains, however, as to whether the record justifies drawing a
distinction between persons earning less than or more than $10,000 annually. It is
submitted that the distinction was based on the court's rather peculiar reading of the
record, in which only two of the three panelists joined. See id. at 1102-03 (Weiner, J.,
dissenting).
It is further submitted that a sounder approach was adopted in an almost
identical Delaware case challenging confessions. See Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp.
1349 (D. Del. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 971, reinstated,359 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1972).
In Osmond, over the dissent of Judge Van Dusen, the Circuit Judge on the Swarb
panel, the court held that the failure of the statutory scheme to provide a means of
determining the validity of the waiver rendered the scheme unconstitutional as
applied to all parties. 327 F. Supp. at 1356-57.
In the appeal which followed on behalf of individuals excluded from the scope
of the Swarb holding (mortgagors and parties earning more than $10,000 annually),
the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that confessions were not unconstitutional per se
and that the district court decisions would not be further reviewed in view of the onesided nature of the appeal. 405 U.S. at 200. Thus, the Court avoided review of the logic
of the distinctions created by the Swarb district court.
86. 319 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
87. Id. at 285.
88. Id. at 294.

https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol23/iss4/5

12

Scholl: Parks v. Mr. Ford and the Development of a Rational Approach to R

1977-1978]

PARKS V. "MR. FORD"

Turning to the statutes, the court concluded that distraint sales,
which were performed by state officials, unconstitutionally deprived
the tenants of their property. 89
The very difficult issue of the effect of contractual provisions
expressly authorizing the use of confession and distraint were hence
overcome in Swarb and Santiago, in the former principally because
a significant number of the protected debtors were held to have been
shown not to have understood the confession clauses, 90 and in the
latter because the provisions were found to be an adhesion
contract. 91
The state action issue was never raised in Swarb,. presumably
because the defendants were state officials and the suit represented a
direct attack on entry and execution on state court judgments by the
defendants. 92 It was raised in Santiago, but avoided because the
district court considered only distraint sales, which were performed
93
by the state officials.
The Supreme Court decisions in Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp.94 and Fuentes v. Shevin,95 both decided early in 1972, appeared
to establish a trend toward eliminating roadblocks to due process
attacks on creditors' remedies. In Lynch, the Court discredited the
property rights-personal rights distinction that some courts had
read into section 1343(3) of the federal judicial code. 96 A contrary
result would have probably halted future due process attacks in

89. Id. at 295. Although the Santiago court did not address the issue of the
constitutionality of distraint levies, subsequent attacks on distraint levies succeeded,
rather surprisingly, without any real difficulty with the state action issue. See, e.g.,
Ragin v. Schwartz, 393 F. Supp. 152 (W.D. Pa. 1975) (three-judge court); Stots v. Media
Real Estate Co., 355 F. Supp. 240 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Musselman v. Spies, 343 F. Supp.
528 (M.D. Pa. 1972) (three-judge court).
90. 314 F. Supp. at 1100.
91. 319 F. Supp. at 294.
92. 314 F. Supp. at 1093.
93. 319 F. Supp. at 292.

94. 405 U.S. 538 (1972).
95. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).

96. 405 U.S. at 543. Section 1343(3) states in relevant part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action
authorized by law to be commenced by any person:
To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the
Constitution of the United States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal
rights of citizens or of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970).
The Lynch Court held that "[n]either the words of § 1343(3) nor the legislative
history of that provision distinguishes between personal and property rights." 405
U.S. at 543.
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federal courts on creditors' remedies on jurisdictional grounds. 97 By
striking down the Florida and Pennsylvania statutes authorizing
prejudgment replevin seizures in Fuentes,98 the Supreme Court
broadened the scope of Sniadach. The Fuentes decision emphasized
that a temporary taking constituted a property deprivation requiring
due process protections in all but certain enumerated exceptional
circumstances. 99 It clarified the Sniadach language relating to
wages and made clear that all property, even household goods of
relatively modest worth, was subject to due process protection. 1' °
Finally, the Court made a strong statement, reminiscent of that by
Judge Lord in Santiago,1 1 that the execution of the consumer credit
contracts involved did not constitute a waiver of due process rights
10 2
by the consumers.
In Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,' 0 3 the Court upheld the constitutionality of the Louisiana sequestration procedure, seemingly
indistinguishable from the replevin procedures considered in
Fuentes.10 4 The Court thus appeared to overrule Fuentes or at least to
distinguish it out of significance. However, eight months later, the
Court expressly restored the vitality of Fuentes in North Georgia

97. Section 1343(3) dispenses with the $10,000 minimum amount in controversy
required by § 1331, the general federal-question provision. Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3)
(1970) with 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
98. 407 U.S. at 96.
99. The Fuentes Court observed that "it is now well settled that a temporary,
nonfinal deprivation of property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in the terms of the
Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 84-85. As examples of the exceptional circumstances
under which the Court had permitted "outright seizure," the Fuentes Court listed
seizure "to collect the internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of a
national war effort, to protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure, and to
protect the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated food." Id. at 91-92
(footnotes omitted).
100. Although the Court noted that "there may be many gradations in the
'importance' or 'necessity' of various consumer goods," it maintained that "if the root
principle of procedural due process is to be applied with objectivity, it cannot rest on
such distinctions." Id. at 89-90.
101. See text accompanying note 88 supra.
102. 407 U.S. at 95. The Court stated:
There was no bargaining over contractual terms between the parties who, in any
event, were far from equal in bargaining power. The purported waiver provision
was a printed part of a form sales contract and a necessary condition of the sale.
The appellees made no showing whatever that the appellants were actually
aware or made aware of the significance of the fine print now relied upon as a
waiver of constitutional rights.
Id.
103. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
104. The statutes involved in Fuentes authorized writs ordering seizure of a
debtor's possessions upon the the ex parte application of creditors. No pre-seizure
notice or pre- or post-seizure hearing opportunity was provided. 407 U.S. at 69-70. The
Louisiana procedure challenged in Mitchell was similar, but it did provide for
procedural safeguards. Id. at 616-18. See note 51 supra; text accompanying notes
105-07 infra.
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FinishingInc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.105 In Di-Chem, the Court explained
the ruling in Mitchell as attributable to the unique "saving
characteristics" of the Louisiana statute applied in the earlier
case, 10 6 and struck down a Georgia statutory scheme, lacking these
0 7 Hence,
characteristics, very similar to those attached in Fuentes.1
it was Mitchell rather than Fuentes that was limited in application
108
to its facts.
Ironically, the Supreme Court decided Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis'0 9 on the same day as Fuentes. Although it was certainly not
apparent at the time, Moose Lodge was destined to be one of the
principal authorities invoked to prevent the extension of attacks on
creditors' remedies. 10 In Moose Lodge, the Court refused to find the
lodge's discriminatory membership and guest policies violative of
the fourteenth amendment because the Court rejected the contention
that the state's regulation of the lodge's liquor license constituted the
requisite state action."' In Moose Lodge and Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.," 2 in which the Court refused to find violative of due
process a utility's policy of prehearing termination of service for
alleged unpaid bills because of the absence of state action, 113 the

105. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
106. Id. at 607. See note 51 supra for a catalogue of these "saving characteristics."
107. Id. The Court considered significant the fact that the Georgia statute involved
in Di-Chern allowed a clerk of the court to issue a writ of garnishment on the basis of
a creditor's conclusory allegations and that no provision was present for an early
post-seizure hearing. Id.
108. Another potential legal development that could result in a limitation upon
attacks on creditors' remedies emerged from the dissenting opinions of Justice White,
joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Blackmun, in Fuentes and Lynch. 407 U.S. at
97 (White, J., dissenting); 405 U.S. at 556 (White, J., dissenting). In both cases, the
dissent urged that the considerations of comity, equity and federalism enunciated in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its companion cases, should bar the relief
sought since state proceedings were ongoing at the time the plaintiffs initiated their
actions in federal court. 407 U.S. at 98 (White, J., dissenting); 405 U.S. at 560 (White,
J., dissenting). The full extent of the application of Younger to attacks on creditors'
remedies is uncertain but it clearly did have an impact in two recent Supreme Court
decisions. See Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977) (attack on Illinois'
prejudgment attachment proceeding barred by Younger); Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327
(1977) (challenge to state civil contempt proceeding against debtors who failed to
appear barred by Younger). However, neither Justice White nor any other member of
the Court mentioned Younger in the Swarb opinions, where, since the plaintiffs
sought directly to enjoin entry and execution upon certain state court judgments, it
would seem most likely to have applied. See 405 U.S. at 191. Thus, the Younger
doctrine has properly not been extended to the point where it is a significant bar to
attacks on creditors' remedies. Of course, it has no application in attacks on purely
extrajudicial remedies, such as liens and repossession.
109. 407 U.S. 163 (1972).
110. For examples of cases in which Moose Lodge was cited as authority by courts
finding that state action was absent from creditors' remedies, see note 114 infra.
111. 407 U.S. at 177.
112. 419 U.S. 345 (1974).
113. Id. at 358-59.
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Court developed the framework for subsequent decisions in which
courts refused to hold creditors' remedies unconstitutional because
114
state action was lacking.
Following Fuentes, Di-Chem, Moose Lodge and Jackson, it is
apparent that state action is the principal barrier to due process
attacks on creditors' remedies, at least those involving extrajudicial
liens and repossession. The courts have responded to these decisions
in various ways, 115 since none of these cases is decisive of the issue.
After refusing to review numerous repossession cases, 1 6 the
Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in Brooks v. Flagg
Brothers, Inc.," 7 in which the Second Circuit found state action
present in an attack on the sale provisions of the warehouseman's
lien law. 118 Thus, the Court may now be prepared to clear up the
thicket of inconsistency which has arisen' 19 in light of the
emergence of the state action issue in the five years since its decision
in Fuentes.
C.

The ConsiderationsDeemed Relevant by the Courts
in Deciding the State Action Issue in
Various Creditors' Remedies

The considerations deemed relevant by the circuit courts of
appeals that have determined the presence or absence of state action
in due process attacks in lien or repossession cases can be divided
into five categories: 1) state participation; 2) presence of state
statute; 3) presence of parties' contract; 4) common law history; and
5) existence of a "roving commission" for the creditor.
1. State Participation
On a superficial level, the creditors' remedies cases appear to
consistently hold that a remedy which is enforced by the participation of state officials is, for that reason alone, infused with state

114. See, e.g., Calderon v. United Furniture Co., 505 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1974);
Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F.2d 697 (6th Cir. 1974); Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank of
Conn., 493 F.2d 739 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974).
115. See note 73 and accompanying text supra.
116. The Court did give plenary consideration to one repossession case. See
Gonzalez v. Automatic Employees Credit Union, 419 U.S. 90 (1974). However, the
Court used this case only as a tool to resolve a "standing" issue related to three-judge
courts and carefully avoided any discussion of the merits of the underlying
repossession case. Id. at 101.
117. 553 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 54 (1977).
118. 553 F.2d at 772.
119. See notes 62-71 and accompanying text supra.
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action. 120 This would explain the result in Fuentes in which state
action was never raised as an issue. 121 Similarly, it can be argued
that in Sniadach, the state action issue was not even raised because
of the very slight state official participation.122 However, state
participation may be present in many different forms. Therefore,
while on the surface state participation seems an objective and
simple means to measure state action, this surface simplicity is
somewhat illusory.
For example, it can be argued that any state regulation relevant
to a certain activity is state participation. However, Moose Lodge
restricts this principle by holding that state regulation sufficient to
establish state action in the conduct of the regulated party per se
must be directly involved with the challenged activity. 23 The Court
emphasized this holding by noting that state action was involved in
enforcement of a state regulation requiring the lodge to adhere to its
own discriminatory bylaws. 24 The Moose Lodge Court rejected the
argument that the state's regulation of the lodge's liquor license was
sufficient to establish state action in the lodge's discriminatory
25
policies.
Because public utilities are so closely regulated, the Jackson
Court's holding that no state action was involved in the public
utility's actions 126 strongly reaffirms the Moose Lodge limitation
that regulation not directly relevant to the challenged activity fails
to establish state action. The Jackson Court rejected the argument
that the state's tacit approval of the utility's termination policies by
allowing them to go into effect was sufficient to establish state
action. 127 Although it seems difficult to distinguish the state's
alleged "failure to act" in Jackson from its "action" in producing a
writ of garnishment for the creditor on demand in Sniadachor from
the prothonotary's entry of a writ of replevin in Fuentes, it must be
noted that Jackson is not a creditors' remedy case in the ordinary
sense. In Jackson, the customer had no ownership of the electricity
supplied by the utility, and no detention or seizure of property

120. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969); Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
121. Under both the Pennsylvania and Florida statutes challenged in Fuentes, the
property was seized by a state officer. 407 U.S. at 75-78.
122. See note 80 supra.
123. 407 U.S. at 179.
124. Id. at 177-79.
125. Id. at 176-77.
126. 419 U.S. at 358.
127. Id. at 357.
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occurred. 128 It is therefore difficult to apply Jackson to the creditors'
remedies cases.
There is little or no state participation or regulation of the
innkeeper's or warehouseman's lien. However, repairman's lien
sales, at least as applied to motor vehicles, and motor vehicle
repossession sales, are instances involving some degree of state
participation, since state officials must transfer the titles after the
sale to allow the sellers to legally effect a sale. Nevertheless, the
repossession cases have routinely rejected the argument that this
129
direct state participation is relevant on the issue of state action.
It is therefore submitted that direct state participation has not
been a particularly important factor in resolving the state action
issue. Rather, the courts seem to assume that the enforcement of a

128. The utility company simply discontinued service to plaintiffs home because
of asserted delinquency in payments due for service. Id. at 347.
129. Judge Garth's reasoning in Parks is typical of the reasoning employed in the
repossession cases:
If the role played by state employees in issuing new certificates of title to
garagemen who foreclose on their liens were enough to infuse those foreclosures
with state action, then obviously there would be state action as well whenever a
new or used car is purchased and a new certificate of title is issued. By the same
logic, the service which state employees perform in recording deeds and
mortgages would seem to inject state action into virtually every real estate
transaction.
556 F.2d at 141 (plurality opinion). Apparently, Judge Garth believed that these were
situations in which a state action finding would be improbable or against public
policy. However, it is submitted that a finding of state action in the situations
mentioned by Judge Garth would be no more improbable than the finding that state
action was present when state participation was invoked in a purely private dispute
in the form of judicial actions as in Sniadach and Fuentes.In fact, it seems clear that
constitutional violations effected in sales of merchandise or transfers of real estate are
infused with state action. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
In Gibbs, (see note 138 and accompanying text infra), the Third Circuit
reasoned that the title transfer was insignificant for state action purposes because: 1)
the title transfer occurred after "the alleged deprivation" of the repossession had
taken place; and 2) the title transfer did not determine ownership, but was merely for
the purpose of registration. 502 F.2d at 1113 n.17. The second point is countered by a
Pennsylvania statute requiring any owner of a vehicle to have a certificate of title for
it (see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 75, § 201(a) (Purdon 1971)) and by cases holding that title
does "establish the person entitled to possession." Speck Cadillac-Olds, Inc. v.
Goodman, 373 Pa. 83, 88, 95 A.2d 191, 193 (1953). See also, Summers Estate, 424 Pa.
195, 198, 226 A.2d 197, 199 (1967); Majors v. Majors, 153 Pa. Super. Ct. 175, 178, 33
A.2d 442, 444 (1943), affl'd, 349 Pa. 334, 37 A.2d 528 (1944). The first point is countered
by the observation that the seizure and sale consummated by a title transfer effect
different property deprivations. While the title transfer may not be relevant to the
seizure deprivation, it is certainly relevant to the sale deprivation. See Swiggett v.
Watson, 441 F. Supp. 241 (D. Del. 1977) (Director of Division of Motor Vehicles
enjoined from transferring titles of vehicles sold pursuant to Delaware Lien Law,
which court declared unconstitutional).
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seizure by state officials, in a manner similar to Fuentes,130 is the
only state participation which merits consideration.'1'
2.

Presence of State Statute

A state statute is present to establish or support nearly every
32
creditors' remedy which has been subjected to due process attack.
The notable exception is the repairman's detention lien in Parks,
which is a creature of common law. 13 This distinction was not cited
as an important factor in any of the Parks opinions. Furthermore,
Judge Hunter devoted much of his opinion to expressly rejecting the
34
significance of this issue.
However, in the absence of a clear declaration of state policy
through other manifestations, the presence of a state statute might
be a significant factor in measuring state involvement. The Parks
court appears to have properly not considered the presence of the
state statute to be a decisive issue since the state policy of
recognition of the common law lien was clear. 35 In Jackson,
however, where the state statute and common law practice were
absent, this factor might be a clue to the result, since prehearing
utility terminations are not expressly sanctioned by constant
judicial or administrative enforcement as are the repairman's lien or
repossession situations.
3.

Presence of Parties' Contract

A contract is typically not present in the repairman or innkeeper
situations. It is always present in the repossession cases, yet, among
the repossession cases, only one court has placed any reliance on
this factor.1 36 Similarly, in Fuentes the Supreme Court refused to rely

130. The prejudgment replevin laws in Fuentes authorized summary seizure of
goods by state agents upon the ex parte application of an individual who posted a
security bond for double the value of the property to be seized. 407 U.S. at 73-78.
131. This is perhaps best illustrated by the district court in Parks.The court found
the nonofficial seizure by constables acting as private landlords' agents to be direct
state participation but refused to find such participation in the official act of a state
officer's title transfer. 386 F. Supp. at 1260-65.
132. See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, §§ 11-14 (Purdon 1963). For the text of these
statutes, see note 9 supra.
133. 556 F.2d at 134.
134. See id. at 163 (Hunter, J., concurring).
135. The Parks court cited Wilson v. Malenock, 128 Pa. Super. Ct. 544, 194 A. 508
(1937), as indicating that the Pennsylvania common law permitted repairmen to
retain repaired items until payment is made. 556 F.2d at 134.
136. See Shirley v. State Nat'l Bank of Conn., 493 F.2d 739, 741-42 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1009 (1974).
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on the parties' contract to establish an effective due process waiver
137
in a similar context.
However, in certain situations, the significance of the parties'
contract has been emphasized. In Gibbs the Third Circuit panel
expressly declined to determine the presence of state action where a
contract authorizing repossession was not present. 138 It is submitted,
however, that the importance of this factor was eroded by the failure
39
of the court to discuss the issue except in one qualifying footnote.
In Smith v. Bekins Moving & Storage Co., 40 Judge Van
Artsdalen also emphasized the significance of the existence of a
contract. 141 It is submitted, however, that the vitality of Smith is
142
questionable subsequent to Parks.
In his concurring opinion in Parks, Judge Adams discussed the
presence of the parties' contract. 143 According to Judge Adams, "in
the absence of a close nexus between the state and the contract in
question, it would seem that action taken pursuant to a contractual
right is not state action.' 144 It was on this basis that Judge Adams
145
distinguished between Gibbs and Parks.
4.

Common Law History

The single factor most often discussed by the courts in the
resolution of the state action issue in challenges to creditors'
remedies must surely be the common law history of the remedy in
question. 46 It is fair to say that in the opinions of Judges Garth and

137. 407 U.S. at 94-96.
138. 502 F.2d at 1113 n.15a. The Gibbs court specifically noted that it was "not
faced with reaching a determination of 'state action' where the documents on which
repossession is predicated are silent as to default and repossession remedies." Id.
139. See id.
140. 384 F. Supp. 1261 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
141. Id.at 1263-64.
142. Smith involved a Pennsylvania statute which permitted a warehouseman to
enforce his lien on stored property to satisfy unpaid charges by selling the property at
a public or private sale. Id. at 1262. This provision, which was upheld by the Smith
court, was very similar to the statute declared unconstitutional by the Parks court.
Compare PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 7-210 (Purdon 1970) with PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 6,
11-14 (Purdon 1963).
143. See 556 F.2d at 147 n.18 (Adams, J., concurring).
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See, e.g., Melara v. Kennedy, 541 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1976); Anastasia v.
Cosmopolitan Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 527 F.2d 150 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 971 (1976); Washington v. Saxe, order filed, C.A. No. 74-593 (M.D. Pa., Dec. 27,
1974) (common law counterpart to warehouseman's lien crucial to court's analysis).
Other courts have emphasized that the absence of a common law counterpart
to a statutory lien was important to a finding that state action was present. See, e.g.,
Brooks v. Flagg Bros., 553 F.2d 764 (2d Cir.). cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 54 (1977);
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Hunter in Parks, and therefore in the minds of the majority of the
Third Circuit bench, it is the important distinction between the
detention and sale in Parks, and hence the determinative issue as to
14 7
the presence of state action there.
Despite this considerable reliance upon the common law history
as an element for determining the presence of state action in cases
involving creditors' remedies, such reasoning has frequently been
criticized. In Parks, both Judges Adams and Gibbons insisted that
the enactment of the fourteenth amendment created a new scale for
measurement of state law. 148 Thus, the common law history of a
procedure prior to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment would
not be relevant in considering procedures attacked on the basis of
the amendment. 149 Judge Hunter's statement in Parks that the
common law history is relevant to determine whether a procedure
involves a "traditional state function"' 50 has some surface appeal.
However, in the final analysis, Judge Hunter's continued reliance on
the past as a determinative factor of the validity of present laws
comes face to face with Justice Douglas' statement in Sniadach:
"The fact that a procedure would pass muster under a feudal regime

Culbertson v. Leland, 528 F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1975); Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430,
439-40 (5th Cir. 1970), on remand, 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972).
The repossession cases frequently relied heavily upon the common law
heritage of repossession in refusing to find state action. For example, in Gibbs, Judge
Hunter, consistent with his position in Parks, rejected the "comprehensive state
regulation" argument because the pertinent statutes had made repossession more
difficult than it had been prior to their enactment. 502 F.2d at 1110-12. He rejected the
"delegation of state function" argument in the following language: "ITihe chief
obstacle to concluding that self-help repossession involves a traditional state function
is the fact . . . that in one form or another the common law very early recognized
repossession as a private remedy." Id. at 1114. See also Adams v. Southern Cal. First
Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 334 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1006 (1974).
147. Judge Garth stated that "when private individuals engaged in a particular
activity long before the enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, that circumstance
is strong evidence that the activity in question is not one 'traditionally exclusively
reserved to the State."' 556 F.2d at 138-39 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original)
(citations omitted), quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352
(1975).
Judge Hunter recognized that the public function inquiry of the state action
analysis "can be affected in a limited way by the common law origin of a particular
right." 556 F.2d at 163 (Hunter, J., concurring).
148. According to Judge Adams, "The inescapable fact is that promulgation of the
fourteenth amendment substantially changed the legal landscape, and requires that
once-sacrosanct customs be examined anew." 556 F.2d at 146 (Adams, J., concurring)
(footnote omitted).
Judge Gibbons agreed, stating that "the Supreme Court has, by application of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, significantly altered the relative
power positions of debtors and creditors." Id. at 149 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
149. See 556 F.2d at 146 (Adams, J., concurring); id. at 149 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
150. See notes 35 & 36 and accompanying text supra.
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does not mean it gives necessary protection to all property in its
modern forms."'151
A strong case for the irrelevance of the common law history of a
creditors' remedy in the determination of whether a procedure is
infused with state action was made by the First Circuit in Davis v.
Richmond. 52 The Davis court conceded that the inkeeper's lien laws,
153
as applied to the plaintiff, were in derogation of the common law.
It nevertheless concluded that the requisite state action was not
present, quoting the following portion of a law review article written
54
by Messrs. William Burke and David Reber:1
To make state action turn upon whether the statutory right
being asserted has common law origins would lead to anomalous
results. The identical private conduct, pursuant to the identical
state statute or judicial law, would be state action in some states
while not in others depending solely upon the fortuitous and
155
unimportant circumstance of the age and history of the law.
Furthermore, assuming arguendo that the common law history
of a procedure is and should be relevant, it is frequently difficult, as
Judge Hunter noted in Parks, to determine the exact status of a
procedure at a given point in history. 156 Problems exist as to what
point in time during the development of the "common law" should be
focused on and the determination of the precise status of the law at
that point.
5.

Existence of a "Roving Commission" for the Creditor

Another factor which may be relevant in the inquiry as to
whether state action is present in the use of a particular creditor's

151. 395 U.S. at 340.
152. 512 F.2d 201 (1st Cir. 1975).
153. Id. at 203.
154. Burke & Reber, State Action, CongressionalPowers and Creditors'Rights: An
Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 47 (pt. 2) (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Burke & Reber (pt. 2)]. Mr. Burke was the author of an amicus
curiae brief for the creditors in Adams v. Southern Cal. First Nat'l Bank, 492 F.2d 324
(9th Cir. 1973).
155. 512 F.2d at 204, quoting Burke & Reber (pt. 2), supra note 154, at 47.
156. 556 F.2d at 163 (Hunter, J., concurring). For example, the history of
repossession at common law is unclear. The status of acceptance of self-help
repossession at various points in the development of the law has changed from: 1)
acceptance at Greek and Roman law, to 2) prohibition in early English common law,
to 3) increasing tolerance in England since the 18th century, to 4) extremely detailed
and restrictive regulation under the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, adopted in many
states, including Pennsylvania, in the early 20th century, to 5) the unrestricted loose
procedural setting established in the Uniform Commercial Code. See McCall, The
Past as Prologue: A History of the Right to Respossess, 47 S.CAL. L. REv. 58 (1973).
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remedy is its creation of a so-called "roving commission" to the
creditor to seize or continue unconsented retention of property which,
as in execution on a judgment by state officers, which is not subject
to a security interest or has no direct relation to the debtor's
obligation. 157 The existence of a "roving commission" is, however,
frequently not a factor in these decisions. Certainly the warehouseman exercises no roving commission since he merely retains and
sells the goods which are stored with him. Yet, the Second Circuit
found state action to be present in a warehouseman's lien in Flagg
Brothers. 58 In both the landlord and repairman situations roving
can be said to occur. 159 A landlord may seize a tenant's property, the
value of which may far exceed any rent owed. Similarly, a
repairman may retain an expensive automobile for non-payment of a
small repair charge.
Since the concept of the "roving commission" and its effect on a
finding of state action is not discussed or analyzed by the Third
Circuit in Parks or Gibbs, it does not appear to have been a factor in
these cases.
6.

Summary and Analysis

From the foregoing, it would appear that the basis upon which
courts most frequently rely in analyzing state action is the common
law history of the particular creditor's remedy. It is submitted, in
light of the reasons why the common law history is not a cogent or
logical factor upon which to focus, 160 that the courts' emphasis on
this issue explains in part the confusion in state action determina161
tions.
Participation by a state official is often mentioned in distinguishing such cases as Swarb 62 and Fuentes,'163 where there is direct
involvement of state officials in the execution of the remedy, from
the lien cases. However, other forms of state participation have
frequently been overlooked. 64 If "state participation" is defined to
mean only direct state involvement in the execution process, it is

157. See, e.g., James v. Pinnix, 495 F.2d 206 (5th Cir. 1974).
158. 553 F.2d at 766.
159. The roving commission concept was invoked most notably by the Fifth
Circuit in distinguishing repossession from the landlord's lien which it declared
unconstitutional in Hall v. Garson, 430 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1970), on remand, 468 F.2d
845 (5th Cir. 1972).
160. See notes 152-56 and accompanying text supra.
161. See notes 62-74 and accompanying text supra.
162. See notes 82-85 and accompanying text supra.
163. See notes 98-102 and accompanying text supra.
164. See notes 130-31 and accompanying text supra.
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submitted that the courts should not focus upon it in analyzing state
action.
Presence of a state statute 6 5 and the existence of a "roving
commission"' 16 6 have not, per se, been especially significant factors
in the decisionmaking process. Nor, it is submitted, should they be,
except to the somewhat limited extent that they reveal state
involvement in the procedures.
In Parks, Judge Adams relied on the presence of a contract
between debtor and creditor as a factor which should militate
against a finding of state action. 167 However, the adhesive nature of
the creditor-debtor relationship renders this factor of little practical
value in resolution of the state action issue. The Supreme Court in
Fuentes168 and the three-judge court in Santiago169 took judicial
notice of the adhesion contracts present in such a relationship. It is
suggested that in such a context, where the creditor can exact
almost anything from the debtor in a form contract, the state's
pronouncements limiting the creditor's range of action, either by its
statutes or common law, will be more significant than the presence
of a contract.
Analysis of these considerations leads to the conclusion that
none of them, as they have been discussed by the courts, should be
the most significant issue in the determination of the presence of
state action in creditors' remedies. It is therefore important to
identify the proper issues and develop a decision making process
that will focus upon them.
D.

1.

The Considerations Upon Which the Courts Should
Focus in Resolving the Issue of the Presence
of State Action in Creditors' Remedies

The Policy Issue Involved

The basic policy issue in the entire string of due process
challenges to creditors' remedies is the desirability of creating
national minimum due process standards for creditors' remedies.
The opposite ends of the spectrum regarding the merits of this policy

165. See, e.g., text accompanying note 134 supra.
166. See, e.g., text accompanying note 151 supra.

167. See text accompanying note 144 supra.
168. See text accompanying note 102 supra.
169. See text accompanying note 91 supra.
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question are expressed by Burke and Reber, 170 on one hand, and
Judge Gibbons in Parks,171 on the other.
On the basis of their strong views regarding what they consider
the principles of federalism, Burke and Reber urge against the
extension of a national minimum due process standard to additional
creditors' remedies. 172 Freedom from federal intervention, according
to these authors, "allows citizens to order their relationships free
from federal constitutional interference," promotes self-help, which
they submit is at the core of private ordering, and leaves lawmaking
strictly to the state legislatures and Congress, which they deem
better able to adjust the complex economic factors which must be
173
considered.
In direct contrast, Judge Gibbons views the "judicial lawmaking" of the creditors' remedy-due process cases as imposing a
welcome and necessary "national4 minimum due process" standard
7
for debtor-creditor transactions.
It is submitted that the question of the desirability of creating a
national minimum due process standard for creditors' remedies has
already been properly answered by the Supreme Court in Sniadach,175 the extension of that decision in Fuentes,176 the reaffirmation
of Fuentes in Di-Chem,177 and the rejection of the potential
jurisdictional limitations upon such cases in Lynch. 178 These cases,
it is submitted, reveal the proper judicial conclusion that state
procedural schemes establishing creditors' remedies have consistently overlooked the due process violations that result from

170. Burke & Reber, State Action, CongressionalPower and Creditors"Rights: An
Essay on the Fourteenth Amendment (pt. 1) 46 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, [hereinafter cited
as Burke & Reber (pt. 1)]; Burke & Reber (pt. 2), supra note 154. Burke and Reber
suggest that, with the exception of matters involving racial discrimination: 1)
findings of state action be limited to instances where the state is involved in direct
action or participation with private parties; 2) the public function doctrine be extended
only to cases involving election primaries, instances where there is an attempted
circumvention of prior holdings of state action by property transfers or other
manipulation, and cases where there has been a stifling of speech by parties
assuming government characteristics; and 3) action by private parties pursuant to
state statutes should involve those parties in state action only where the statute
compels the private party, rather than merely permits the party, to act in a certain
manner. Burke & Reber (pt. 1), supra, at 1041-91.
171. See notes 37-49 and accompanying text supra. Judge Gibbons would find
state action in any private party's utilization of a state-sanctioned creditor's remedy.
556 F.2d at 155-56.
172. Burke & Reber (pt. 2), supra note 154, at 53-56.
173. Id. at 52.
174. 556 F.2d at 149 (Gibbons, J., concurring).
175. See notes 75-81 and accompanying text supra.
176. See notes 98-100 and accompanying text supra.
177. See notes 105-07 and accompanying text supra.
178. See notes 96 & 97 and accompanying text supra.
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permitting creditors to utilize heavyhanded remedies against alleged
debtors in proceedings in which the creditors are allowed to make
interested ex parte decisions on the merits of their claims.
Enforcement of one-sided state laws and procedures have made the
development of a national minimum due process standard not only
desirable, but necessary.
Unquestionably, the philosophical direction of the Supreme
Court has changed since the Sniadach decision in 1969. However,
the contemporary Court decided Di-Chem by a rather comfortable
six-to-three majority. The Court has expressed no tendency to
undercut its prior decisions in this area, with the possible exception
of Jackson.179 It should be noted however, that the Di-Chem decision
was rendered after the decision in Jackson.
It is possible that the Court could strike upon the state action
issue as the means of restricting the development of nationalization
of due process standards for creditors' remedies. However, this would
not appear the most logical place for the courts to develop a
restrictive policy, since, it is submitted, there is little logical
distinction between a creditor's seizure of a debtor's property with
the ministerial assistance of state officials and a creditor's seizure,
and even sale, of that property himself.
2.

The Relevant Supreme Court State Action Decisions

The emphasis by Judge Adams in Parks upon the basic
similarity of all prejudgment creditors' remedies - that they all
permit a delegation of the conflict resolution machinery to the
creditor - is the logical starting point in the resolution of the state
action issue in the creditors'-remedies cases. As Judge Adams stated,
"Conflict resolution is now seen as one of the core attributes of the
sovereign."' 1
Judge Adams' language is consistent with the observations of
Justice Harlan in Boddie v. Connecticut.18' Concluding that the
failure of the states to provide a mechanism for obtaining divorces in
forma pauperis was violative of due process, Justice Harlan stated
that
no characteristic of an organized and cohesive society is more
fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a system of
rules defining the various rights and duties of its members,

179. See notes 112-14 and accompanying text supra.
180. 556 F.2d at 146 (Adams, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
181. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
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enabling them to . . . settle their differences in an orderly,
predictable manner ....
.. . Without this guarantee that one may not be deprived of
his rights, neither liberty nor property, without due process of
law, the State's monopoly over techniques for binding conflict
resolution could hardly be said to be acceptable ....
Only by
providing that the social enforcement mechanism must function
strictly within these bounds
can we hope to maintain an ordered
82
society that is also just.
The conclusion which follows from the foregoing is that the
establishment of a formalized system for taking property from one
person and giving it to another is, by necessity, a monopoly of the
state. Otherwise, enforcement by interested parties would result,
exacerbating conflicts, encouraging unrestrained self-help, and
possibly resulting in the occurrence of civil disorder. A corollary to
this result is that the state's procedures must be within the bounds of
justice or due process of law. In recognition of this principle, states
have uniformly established judicial systems requiring that parties
seeking to deprive others of property first obtain a judgment and
then effect execution upon that judgment through state officers to
forcibly seize the property of another.
The conclusion that state action is lacking in a particular
context begins with the observation that the fourteenth amendment
does not pertain to the actions of private individual's interests. This
83
principle was initially enunciated in the Civil Rights Cases.1
However, in the Civil Rights Cases, the principal dichotomy drawn
was between acts of purely private discrimination and acts which,
while private in one sense, were supported by state authority. 8 4 An
act was said to be a private wrong, beyond the scope of the
fourteenth amendment, "if not sanctioned in some way by the State,
or not done under State authority," or "unless protected in these
wrongful acts by some shield of State law or State authority
"185

182. Id. at 374-75. This language is similar to earlier statements of the Court. See
Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Say. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 682 (1930); Hovey v. Elliott,.
167 U.S. 409, 417 (1897). See also Watson v. Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945,
961-73 (W.D. Mich. 1974), for a complete analysis of this issue in the context of
repossession.
183. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
184. Justice Bradley stated that "it is proper to state that civil rights, such as are
guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the
wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws,
customs, or judicial or executive proceedings." Id. at 17.
185. Id. It is submitted that the presence of a state statute or the existence of a
clear state policy at common law, as exists in state procedures establishing creditors'
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The same distinction reappeared in Shelley v. Kraemer. 86 In
Shelley, the Court held that, while private enforcement of racially
restrictive covenants did not constitute state action, the enforcement
of such covenants by the state courts constituted "full and complete"
18 7
state action.
The Moose Lodge' 88 Court made the same private-public
distinction in its state action analysis. The Court first noted that
"Moose Lodge is a private club in the ordinary meaning of that
term."'18 9 Despite this, the Court found state action in the state's
enforcement of its neutral regulation which required the Moose
Lodge to adhere to its own discriminatory policies.' 9°
The private-public distinction favors the conclusion that state
action is present in the enforcement of creditors' remedies. Creditors
are not private clubs or institutions, but typically open their doors to
the public. The private racial discrimination held insufficient to
come within the scope of the fourteenth amendment was the most
basic sort of private conduct protected by the right of freedom of
association. In contrast, the particularly public nature of the credit
industry and of the exercise of conflict resolution, a "core attribute"
of the state, 191 would appear to be at the opposite end of the privatepublic dichotomy expressed by the Court in the Civil Rights Cases,
Shelley and Moose Lodge.
The Supreme Court has consistently found state action present
whenever the state has placed its own power or authority behind the
conduct of a private party. Such an analysis is the foundation of the
192
Supreme Court's decisions in Shelley and in Barrows v. Jackson.
A unanimous Shelley Court held that state action was present
because the enforcement of the racially restrictive covenants by the
state courts, though included in private agreements, constituted
state action. 93 The Barrows Court considered whether damages
could be awarded against a party who breached a racially restrictive
covenant. 194 The Court held that damages could not be awarded
constitutionally because the result "would be to encourage the use of

remedies, clearly sanctions a creditor's acts. The acts should thus be treated as
accomplished under state authority.
186. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
187. Id. at 19.

188. See notes 109-11 and accompanying text supra.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.

407 U.S. at 171.
Id. at 179.
See text accompanying note 180 supra.
346 U.S. 249 (1953).
334 U.S. at 19-20.
346 U.S. at 251.
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restrictive covenants. To that extent, the state would act to put its
195
sanction behind the covenants."'
The judicial enforcement power of the state held sufficient to
draw an otherwise private contractual agreement into the arena of
state action in Shelley and Barrows is comparable to the state power
present in the enforcement of creditors' remedies. Because of the
presence of legislative enactments or a clear common law policy, it is
unnecessary to litigate the creditor's right to exercise and enforce his
remedies to ascertain the stance of the state in a particular matter;
clearly, the state will enforce the creditor's use of these remedies.
Hence, it is submitted that the existence of the laws and statutes
more clearly "encourage[s] the use" of the particular creditor's
remedy than the state court's action of enforcing racially restrictive
196
covenants in Shelley and Barrows.
That the source of the state's expression of power is insignificant
was made apparent by a line of Supreme Court cases that overturned
criminal convictions of parties who engaged in "sit-ins" in defiance
of racial discrimination in public places in the South. In Peterson v.
City of Greenville,197 the Court was faced with segregation at a
lunch counter that was mandated by a city ordinance prohibiting
integration of the races. 98 Alternative to its holding that the
mandatory state statute rendered the private discrimination state
action, the Peterson Court found that, even if the store's manager
had acted independently of the ordinance and without knowledge of
it, state action would be present in the state's enforcement of the
ordinance in the manner of Shelley. 199

195. Id. at 254.
196. The Court reached a conclusion analogous to that reached in Shelley and
Barrows in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In Sullivan, the
Court held
We may dispose at the outset of two grounds asserted to insulate the
judgment of the Alabama courts from constitutional scrutiny. The first is the
proposition relied on by the State Supreme Court - that "The Fourteenth
Amendment is directed against State action and not private action." That
proposition has no application to this case. Although this is a civil lawsuit
between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state rule of law
which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional
freedoms of speech and press. It matters not that that law has been applied in a
civil action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute. See
e.g., Alabama Code, Tit. 7 §§ 908-917. The test is not the form in which state
power has been applied, but, whatever the form, whether such power has in fact
been exercised.
Id. at 265.
197. 373 U.S. 244 (1963).
198. Id. at 245-47.
199. Id. at 248.
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In the next case, Lombard v. Louisiana,2w the defendants were
convicted of "criminal mischief" for attempting to integrate a lunch
counter. 201 Unlike Peterson, there was no state statute or city
ordinance requiring segregation. Nevertheless, the Court held that
state action was present because several city officials were found to
have encouraged the arrests by inflammatory public statements
which were said to make the arrests "'conform to state policy and
2
practice' as well as local custom."

2

The Supreme Court extended Peterson and Lombard in Robinson v. Florida.203 The Robinson Court held that state statutes
requiring separate restrooms in places where food was served
"embody a state policy putting burdens upon any restaurant which
serves the two races, burdens bound to discourage the serving of
both races together." 204 On that basis, the Court held that sufficient
state action existed to overturn on federal constitutional grounds the
defendants' convictions of a misdemeanor for remaining in a
restaurant after being ordered to leave. 2°5
The Court has thus made clear that the state's power of
enforcement of racial segregation is more significant than the means
by which it exercises that power. A direct prohibition of integration
by the state, while certainly sufficient to put the weight of the state
behind discrimination by private parties in public places, was held,
in the final analysis, not to be the exclusive method by which the
state could do so. State action or statutes which encouraged
discrimination no more directly than the state enforcement of
creditors' remedies were held sufficient to infuse conduct by private
parties with state action.
Perhaps the strongest expressions of the importance of focusing
upon the practical effect of a state enactment rather than its
wording in determining whether the enactments are subject to
federal constitutional attack are the Supreme Court decisions of
Reitman v. Mulkey 20 6 and Hunter v. Erickson.2 7 In Reitman, the
Court considered a California constitutional amendment which
prohibited the state from enacting any law which would restrict the
right of any person to sell, lease, or rent real property to whomever
he chose. 208 On its face, the amendment merely guaranteed to private
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

373 U.S. 267 (1963).
Id. at 268.
Id. at 270-73.
378 U.S. 153 (1964).
Id. at 156.
Id. at 156-57.

206. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).

207. 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
208. 387 U.S. at 370-71.
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persons the right to dispose of their own real property as they
wished. However, Justice White, writing for the Court, held that the
practical effect of the amendment "was intended to authorize, and
does authorize, racial discrimination in the housing market. The
right to discriminate is now one of the basic policies of the State." 2 9
The Court thus struck down the amendment as violative of the
210
federal constitution.
The Hunter Court considered a city charter amendment which
repealed all prior ordinances and prevented the enactment of any
future ordinances pertaining to the regulation of housing on the
basis of race unless the regulation was approved by a majority of the
city's voters. 211 Unlike the constitutional amendment in Reitmen, the
city charter amendment before the Hunter Court did not foreclose
entirely the future enactment of open-housing laws. Rejecting the
city's argument that the charter amendment neither created a right
to discriminate nor encouraged discrimination nor banned openhousing laws, the Court found that the city "unquestionably wields
state power" 212 and struck down the city charter amendment on
213
constitutional grounds.
Reitman and Hunter represent perhaps the best examples of a
focus by the Supreme Court upon the actual weight a state puts
behind certain policies rather than upon the literal manner in which
the state does so. Neither enactment considered by the Court
commanded dis6rimination, nor, on their face, did they encourage it.
However, in the context in which they were placed they did permit,
and thus encourage, discrimination. It is submitted that in the
creditors' remedies context, the state's actions are even more clearly
committed to the creditor than in the foregoing cases. The
enforcement of creditors' remedies is most often pursuant to state
statutes or a clearly defined common law policy which, unlike the
Reitman or Hunter situation, are far from neutral.
An analysis similar to that established in Reitman and Hunter
was applied in a nonracial context in Public Utilities Commission v.
Pollak.214 In Pollak, plaintiffs sought to enjoin a private municipal
transit authority from the use of radio transmission in its vehicles
on the ground that the transmissions violated their constitutional
rights. 215 Although it refused to grant the plaintiffs the relief which
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Id. at 381.
Id.
393 U.S. at 386-87.
Id. at 389 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 393.
343 U.S. 451 (1952).
Id. at 453.
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they sought on the merits, the Court first considered the state action
issue and found that state action existed. 216 In so finding, the Pollak
Court relied solely on the fact that the Public Utilities Commission, a
government agency, had formally investigated the feasibility of
radio transmissions on public transportation and that "the action of
the Commission in permitting such operation ... amounts to
sufficient Federal Government action to make the First and Fifth
'2 7
amendments applicable thereto." 1
While the Pollak decision was not overruled in Jackson,2 1s it was
certainly limited by that case. The only distinction between the cases
appears to be that the failure of the Pennsylvania Public Utility
Commission to even investigate the termination policies of the
Jackson defendant was distinct from the formal investigation
procedures employed by the Public Utility Commission in Pollak.
This distinction leads to the conclusion that the state can prevent a
court's finding state action by turning its back on even the most
egregious conduct by private entities under its regulation. Also,
constitutional scrutiny of identical conduct by utilities in different
states would vary according to the attention that a state's regulatory
body had given to the particular conduct, thus permitting states too
callous to even consider the issue to insulate their utilities'
219
procedures from constitutional attack.

216. Id. at 462.
217. Id. at 462-63. The Court refused to rely on the fact that the transit company,
while private, operated a public utility or that it had a monopoly in the operation of
the transport system. Id. at 462.
218. See notes 112-14 and accompanying text supra.
219. In the past two years, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission has
shown great interest in the termination policies of utilities under its regulatory
authority. On January 31, 1976, the Commission, in response to several newspaper
stories of deaths caused by utility terminations, enacted interim regulations requiring
prior approval from the Commission before a termination could be effected. 6 PA.
BULL. 162-63 (Jan. 31, 1976). After lengthy hearings on this issue, the Commission
enacted a more detailed interim order regulating terminations on April 18, 1977. 7 PA.
BULL. 1174-76 (Apr. 3, 1977). The Commission still has under advisement a very
detailed set of proposed regulations specifically addressing, inter alia, termination
procedures. 6 PA. BULL. 2988-3001 (Dec. 4, 1976).
If the distinction between Pollak and Jackson suggested here is correct, it
may be that the prehearing termination practice of the same utility which was the
defendant in Jackson, is now subject to constitutional scrutiny. Furthermore, it is
submitted that a state's approach to creditors' remedies is more similar to that of the
regulatory body in Pollak than in Jackson. Enactment of a state statute permitting a
creditor to exercise a certain remedy would appear to constitute the state's placing its
imprimatur on the remedy. Also, the enforcement of a creditor's remedies by state
administrative and judicial action would appear to surpass the state involvement
present in Pollak. Therefore, sufficient state power is manifested behind its
enforcement of creditors' remedies to infuse such remedies with state action. From
this experience, perhaps a logic to the Court's reasoning in Jackson can be perceived.
If an issue is significant enough to cause public disquiet, the state will ultimately be
forced to act upon it.
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Therefore, it is submitted that sufficient state power is manifested behind enforcement of creditors' remedies to infuse nearly all
such remedies with sufficient state action to render the fourteenth
amendment's prerequisites applicable in measuring the legality of
these remedies. This conclusion follows from an analysis based on
considerations used by the Supreme Court in other state action
decisions 220 rather than the artificial considerations utilized by the
221
courts in the recent decisions in the creditors' remedies cases.
3.

A Critique of Treating Racial Discrimination Cases
as a Special Class of State Action Cases

Attempts have been made to distinguish many of the foregoing
cases from creditors' remedies cases because they involved racial
discrimination, which is not an issue in the latter. 222 The acceptability of treating the principles established in the discrimination cases
as applicable to creditors' remedies may be viewed most logically by
analyzing the possible policy behind doing so. Black persons are in
the minority in the United States. Therefore, the white majority, if
allowed to treat blacks or to contract with blacks as they wished,
could easily relegate blacks to second class status. Without state and
federal intervention, this phenomenon has resulted in gross racial
discrimination in such basic commodities as housing and employment opportunities. If the state or the federal government refused to
intervene on behalf of blacks, the weakness of the blacks'
bargaining position would result in even greater discrimination.
The debtor-creditor relationship is somewhat analogous in one
respect - the parties do not have equal bargaining power. Left free
from state control, but not free from state enforcement of contracts
and state laws, the debtor is not only vulnerable to, but has
consistently been the victim of, overreaching by the creditor. 223 In
Fuentes, the Supreme Court recognized, as did the district court in
Santiago,224 the presence of contracts of adhesion in the creditor-

220. See notes 180-219 and accompanying text supra.
221. See notes 120-31 and accompanying text supra.
222. See 556 F.2d at 137 (plurality opinion); Burke & Reber (pt. 1), supra note 170;
Burke & Reber (pt. 2), supra note 154. But see 556 F.2d at 154 (Gibbons, J., concurring)
(no "hierarchy of constitutional values" requiring different state action considerations when discrimination based on race and sex is involved).
A distinction between cases involving discrimination based on race and all
other cases in the determination of state action has not been adopted by the Supreme
Court even in cases where such a distinction would have been possible. See Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974). See also Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Convention, 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
223. See note 88 and accompanying text supra.
224. Id.
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debtor context. 22 5 Therefore, if the state refused to intervene on
behalf of debtors, the weakness of the debtors' bargaining position
would not permit them to further their interests. Like blacks, the
rights of debtors can be protected only by state intervention.
Such reasoning rebuts Judge Adams' argument in Parks that
the contract is significant, 226 at least in the typical creditor and
individual consumer-debtor context. 227 The Shelley Court recognized
that the state's enforcement of a "mere" private agreement that
furthered racial discrimination was, under such circumstances, state
action. 228 It is submitted that in the creditor and individual

consumer-debtor context, the same considerations apply. The
creditor can often exact whatever best serves his interest in a
contract with a consumer. 229 In this situation, it cannot be logically
argued that the existence of a contract setting forth his remedy
should shield the creditor from constitutional attack in enforcing
that remedy.
As a postscript, it should be stated that certain considerations
could change the finding that state action exists in a situation where
a creditor's remedy is at issue. If the creditor and debtor are dealing
at arm's length and both execute a bargained for agreement that is
not an adhesion contract, when Judge Adams' point concerning the
significance of a contract between the parties is indeed meaningful.
In such a case, it would be legitimate to conclude that the creditor's
power flows from the parties' contract. 230
225. 407 U.S. at 95-96.
226. See 556 F.2d at 147 n.18 (Adams, J., concurring).
227. It is submitted that repairmen are generally in a weaker bargaining position
than creditors who finance purchases of motor vehicles. For this reason, they are
unable to obtain adhesion contracts from their customers. There is a certain irony to
winning a case against a modest repairman having a relatively weak bargaining
position, while losing to a corporate giant having a much stronger bargaining
position on the ground that the former, but not the latter, is involved in state action.
228. See note 187 and accompanying text supra.
229. This raises a troubling point with respect to the reasoning of the district court
in Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (three-judge court). If a creditor
drafts contract forms which make the confession clauses so conspicuous that the
debtor does understand their significance, he may possibly argue that the consumer
has knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his due process rights by
executing the contract. This argument might successfully evade the court's holding in
Swarb. See notes 82-85 and accompanying text supra.
However, it is submitted that this alleged waiver would not be voluntary if the
consumer could not avoid entering into an adhesion contract. See Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 95 (1972); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F. Supp. 284, 294 (E.D. Pa. 1970)
(three-judge court). For this reason, the approach of the Swarb court is less than
satisfying in comparison to the results in Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D.
Del. 1971), vacated, 405 U.S. 971, reinstated,359 F. Supp. 124 (D. Del. 1972) (see note
85 supra)and may not be the final word on confessions of judgment in Pennsylvania.
230. As a result, those court decisions which appear to create a rule of law for
business transactions different from that for consumer transactions may have a
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4. Some Final Thoughts on Due Process Requirements
The concurring opinions of Judges Adams and Gibbons in
Parks, juxtaposed to the opinion of Chief Judge Seitz, remind that
the state action issue, while prominent in most recent challenges of
creditors' remedies, is not the only issue present. There is also a due
process issue upon which difference of opinion exists.
Judge Gibbons found that the initial consensual nature of the
repairman's possession of a vehicle which he detains saved the
detention lien from constituting a violation of due process. 231 Judge
Adams was unimpressed with the consensual nature of the initial
possession, but indicated that the interests of repairman and
customer as revealed through empirical data had to be weighed
232
before a decision on the due process issue could be made.
It is submitted that both of these approaches depart from the
approach to the due process issue in creditors' remedies challenges
used by the Third Circuit in Jonnet v. Dollar Savings Bank of New
York 233 and by the Supreme Court. 234 While there should always be a
degree of balancing attempt, the determinative factor in the due
process issue should be whether the detention lien has the Mitchell
"saving characteristics" enumerated in Di-Chem.235 Clearly, the
detention lien contains none of those "saving characteristics," and
has fewer protections for the vehicle owner than the procedures
236
considered in either Fuentes or Di-Chem.

sound basis. Compare D. H. Overmayer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174 (1972), with
Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972). The Second Circuit in FlaggBrothers made this
distinction when it restricted its decision to U.C.C. § 7-210(2), the provision dealing
with consumer transactions, as opposed to U.C.C. § 7-210(1), which deals with
commercial warehousing. 553 F.2d at 774-75. However, such a gross generalization
(business versus consumer) may be overbroad, since adhesion contracts exist in the
business world as well as in consumer transactions. See North Georgia Finishing, Inc.
v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (successful due process challenge of a creditor's
remedy by a business).
231. 556 F.2d at 161 (Gibbons, J., concurring). See Cockerel v. Caldwell, 378 F.
Supp. 491, 498 (W.D. Ky. 1974) (three-judge court); Adams v. Department of Motor
Vehicles, 11 Cal. 3d 146, 520 P.2d 961, 113 Cal. Rptr. 145 (1974).
The Seventh Circuit in Phillips v. Money, 503 F.2d 990 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975), after finding state action absent from a detention lien,
also held that the lien did not violate the debtor's due process rights. 503 F.2d at
994-95. But see Straley v. Gassaway Motor Co., 359 F. Supp. 902 (S.D. W. Va. 1973);
Ford v. Dean's O.K. Tire Store, Inc., judgment filed, CIVIL-LV 1974 (D. Nev., 1973)
(Feb. 9, 1973).
232. 556 F.2d at 143 n.1. (Gibbons, J., concurring).
233. 530 F.2d 1123 (3d Cir. 1976), noted in The Third Circuit Review, 22 ViLL. L.
REV. 606 (1977).
234. See notes 75-81 & 105-114 and accompanying text supra.
235. 419 U.S. at 606-07. See text accompanying notes 106 & 107 supra.
236. Under the statute in Fuentes, the creditor at least had to file a security bond
for double the amount of the property and file a complaint initiating a court action for
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It is further submitted that the consensual nature of the
repairman's initial possession should be irrelevant. As Chief Judge
Seitz observed, the repairman is only a bailee of the items
repaired. 237 Upon the owner's demand for return of the items, the
repairman would be a converter of the property repaired but for the
lien. At that point, the property interest of the repairman in the
property is that of a security device. This interest is not as great as
that of the owner, who frequently has an immediate need for the
item repaired. Thus, it is difficult to understand why Judge Gibbons
concluded that the single element of initial consensual surrender
outweighed the absence of all of the Mitchell "saving characteristics" enumerated in Di-Chem.
Judge Adams' concern is legitimate; the practical economic
effect of a court's decision should never be irrelevant. However,
establishing this effect may be so difficult that its determination
may turn almost exclusively on the allocation of the burden of proof.
Judge Adams apparently concluded that the parties challenging the
creditor's remedy have the burden of showing that abolition of the
remedy challenged will not have a significant economic impact
contrary to the public interest. 238 In contrast, the plaintiffs in

Sniadach and Fuentes prevailed in the absence of any evidence on
the economic consequences of the abolition of the remedies
challenged. It thus appears that subsequent to showing that the
Mitchell "saving characteristics" are absent from a creditors'
remedy, the burden should shift to the creditor to establish that the
perpetuation of his otherwise unconstitutional remedy is saved by its
peculiar value to the public interest.
One other response to Judge Adams is the fact that the historic
reason for the development of the common law lien - the absence of
a remedy on an implied contract at common law, making the lien the
lienholder's only means of collecting obligations due him-

239

is no

longer viable. The lienholder can now both exercise his lien and
proceed in assumpsit in such accessible forums as small claims
courts. Since its common law rationale has disappeared, it is
submitted that the possessory lien is an example of a common law

repossession. 407 U.S. at 74. In Di-Chem, a creditor had to file a bond for double the
amount of the property and make an affidavit before the clerk of court stating the
amount claimed to be due. 419 U.S. at 602-03.
237. 556 F.2d at 166. (Seitz, C.J., concurring and dissenting in part).
238. See id. at 143 n.1. (Adams, J., concurring).
239. See Younger v. Plunkett, 395 F. Supp. 702, 707-708 (E.D. Pa. 1975); R. BROWN,
supra note 27, at § 107, at 510-11; Ames, The History of Assumpsit (pt. 2), 2 HARV. L.
REV. 53, 58 (1888).
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precedent which, its rationale having passed from the scene, can
pass as well without upsetting the social order.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The direct effect of the Parks decision, halting sales but not
halting prejudgment detentions by repairmen, appears modest. Sales
by repairmen have always been far rarer than lien detentions. The
leverage of even a short detention by a repairman upon an owner
who desperately needs the item repaired is frequently enough to
provide the repairman with an unfair advantage over the customer.
However, a repairman who could previously sell a detained vehicle
which occupied space, can no longer do so. This may encourage
repairmen to return vehicles they would have otherwise retained.
The most substantial impact of Parks is unlikely to be its effect
on the repairman's lien laws. The case presented provocative
challenges to the detention lien and the sale and elicited the most
throughtful and diverse judicial consideration of the state action
issues involved in the creditors' remedies cases to date. It may serve
as a stepping stone to abolition of other creditors' remedies and even
240
a reconsideration of at least the sale aspect of repossession.
Parks will undoubtedly serve as a catalyst for the Supreme
Court's weighing of similar issues in Flagg Brothers. As such, it
could spur the Court to the full consideration that the Flagg Brothers
case deserves. If so, the Parks opinions could be among the most
important statements on the constitutionality of creditors' remedies.
V. AUTHOR'S POSTSCRIPT
On May 15, 1978, the United States Supreme Court decided
Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 241 reversing the Second Circuit's finding
that state action existed in the warehouseman's lien sale. The
decision was 5-3, with Justice Rehnquist writing the majority
opinion. Justice Brennan took no part in the decision.

240. Judge Hunter, the author of the Gibbs opinion, suggested in Parks that the
fact that the repairman's sale concerned "the power to determine finally - as opposed
to temporarily - the ownership rights in a chattel," was an important consideration.
556 F.2d at 164 n.2 (Hunter, J., concurring). He further suggested that Gibbs was
distinguishable because it "did not reach the private party's power to sell a
repossessed chattel; it dealt only with a temporary deprivation." Id. This statement
indicates that the Gibbs panel considered only the challenge to the initial seizure
rather than the sale.
A successful attack on the repossession sale would have a significant impact.
With no power to dispose of vehicles seized, repossession creditors would be likely to
exhaust storage space and diminish their aggressiveness in utilizing repossession.
241. 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978).
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Justice Rehnquist focused upon the absence of state participation in distinguishing the Court's prior decisions in Sniadach
through Di-Chem.242 Without discussing most of the cases cited in
this article, the Court devoted much of its opinion to answering the
arguments that 1) the power to sell was such that it should properly
be reserved to the state; and 2) the state encouraged the warehouseman's actions. The first argument was rejected by the Court's
reasoning that only delegation of powers "exclusively" reserved to
the state triggers a finding of state action. 243 The Court also rejected
the second argument, holding that state compulsion rather than
acquiescence was necessary for a finding of state action based upon
244
encouragement.
The hope that Parks would revitalize due process attacks on
oppressive creditors' remedies appears to be extinguished by the
preemptive scope of Flagg Bros. Parks did not serve as a catalyst to
the Court in Flagg Bros., as the majority did not even cite it.
Nevertheless, it is submitted that the FlaggBros. Court rendered an
unsound and incomplete analysis of the state action issue, more
reminiscent of the shallow repossession decisions than the diverse,
thoughtful opinions in Parks.
242. Id. at 1734.
243. Id. at 1735-37.
244. Id. at 1737-38.
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